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THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION TO
LABOR UNIONS -PAST, PRESENT, AND PROPOSED
EDWARD H. MILLXRt AND JoHN B. HUFFAKERt
Today labor unions enjoy practically complete immunity from the
federal antitrust statutes, which now prevent only businessmen from
imposing unreasonable restraints on trade. This immunity of labor
is unique in the long history of antitrust law. Certain labor activi-
ties were held to violate the common law on restraints of trade be-
fore the passage of the first federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act,'
and then, until 1941, the statutory law was held to curb the unions.2
This labor immunity has left the nation so exposed to exploitation
by union-imposed restraints of trade that the wisdom of modifying
the present policy is now receiving serious consideration.
The critics of the unions' immunity cite John L. Lewis' prolonged
fight with the mine owners as an example of the ability of a power-
ful union to control production in essential commodities.3 Without
examining the merits of the unions' or the operators' contention, it
is apparent that the tactics adopted by the union- work stoppages
separated by periods of production on a three day week- have re-
sulted in a grievious loss to the national economy. It is also apparent
that this control of production would be a violation of the Sherman
Act if imposed by any party other than the union.
4
None of our present laws prevent the unions from adopting com-
petition-stifling tactics. While the Taft-Hartley Act provides for an
eighty-day injunction in the event of a national emergency, 5 there
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1. 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. §1-8 (1890) ; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310; To-
ledo. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730; State v. Stewart, 9 Atl. 559;
Cump v. Commonwealth, 6 S. E. 620.
2. The present curbs are discussed on page 9. Suffice to say, they are practi-
cally nil.
3. The report of the President's Fact-Finding Board appeared in the news-
papers of February 12, 1950, and this report indicates that the coal supply was
then at an all-time low.
4. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 373 (1933).
5. §206-209 of the Taft-Hartley Act. National Labor Relations Act 49 Stat.
449 as amended by Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 101,
outlines the injunction procedure.
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are no restrictions in bargaining involving wages and hours that
prevent the union from unreasonably restraining trade to any extent
the unions' whims dictate. This injury to the public that results
from such monopolistic practices is the target of the critics of labor
immunity.
The present immunity of labor and pseudo-labor activity is based
on" legislation subsequent to the Sherman, Act and the judicial in-
terpretation of these laws which sought to foster industrial unionism
and to protect the legitimate interests of the union members. 6 There-
fore, in order to understand to what extent the antitrust laws now
apply to union activities, it is necessary to review the history of the
Sherman Act, and the amendments to it, as they have been applied to
labor unions. Such a study is also essential in order to evaluate
any future legislation on this subject, since it will be interpreted
against the background of past experience under the Sherman, Clay-
ton,7 and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
8
As a preliminary question in practically all antitrust cases involv-
ing labor unions, it has been argued that unions were not within the
scope of the antitrust laws. It is the purpose of Part I of this article
to discuss the gradual growth of this immunity, from the passage of
the Sherman Act to date. However, independent of the special dis-
pensations given to labor by Congress and the courts, it must be
realized that all labor activities do not constitute unreasonable re-
traints of trade any more than all business activities violate the Sher-
man Act. Part II discusses the evolution of the unreasonable re-
straint of trade doctrine as applied to labor unions, in order that the
6. The preamble of both Taft-Hartley and Wagner Acts (29 U. S. C. §151)
read, in part as follows:
"The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and em-
ployers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
associations substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by pre-
venting the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working condi-
tions within and between industries.
"Experience has proved that protection by lav of the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from
injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,
by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of in-
dustrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees."
7. 38 STAT. 730, 15 U. S. C. §12-27, 44; 18 U. S. C. §412; 28 U. S. C. §381-383,
386-390(a); 29 U. S. C. §52, 53 (1914).
8. 47 STAT. 70; 29 U. S. C. §101 et seq. (1932).
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impact of rescinding or limiting the immunity of unions to the anti-
trust laws can be measured. Part III briefly discusses various legis-
lative proposals, with particular reference to S.2912, introduced re-
cently by Senator A. Willis Robertson. 9 It is recognized that any
suggested legislation must be based on the premise that interstate
commerce is subject today to unreasonable and unpreventable res-
straints by labor unions which can jeopardize the economy of the
nation, under the law as it now exists, but this is a purely political
question which need not be discussed here.
I. THE IMMUNITY Or LABOR UNIONS VROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Although labor unions acting alone are legally permitted today to
impose restraints on production even if the result is detrimental to
the national welfare, the same legal precedents which the Supreme
Court has relied upon to show the common law crime of monopoly
by business are the very precedents that demonstrate that all com-
binations of labor for any purpose were originally outlawed in Eng-
land.10 However, the English statutes were gradually liberalized to
legalize labor unions, just as the restrictions on combinations of capi-
tal were also eased. Thus, restraints of trade and monopolies by labor
were not entirely foreign to the antitrust problem when the Sherman
Act was passed in 1890.1"
With this background in mind, it is not surprising that the Sher-
man Act was originally interpreted to apply to labor unions, although
it was not passed with that specific purpose in mind. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act' 2 provides that "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is here-
by declared to be illegal".
This language is unambiguous and unqualified. Read literally, it
includes every combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade,
whether engaged in by labor organizations or others. Thus, the fre-
quently advanced contention that the Sherman Act was not originally
9. S.2912, 81st Cong., 2d. Sess. A statement by Senator Robertson in support
of the Bill is reported at 96 CoNc.. Rtc. 756. (fanuary 23, 1950.)
10. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911) with
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
11. PIOTROWSKI, CARTELS AND TRUSTS (1933), contains an excellent histori-
cal discussion of the history of antitrust legislation. Summaries of early Anglo-
American labor law may be found in practically every labor law casebook. E. g.
HANDLER, CASES ON LABOR LAW, p. 3 (1944).
12. 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. §1 (1890).
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intended to apply to labor13 is predicated chiefly upon -the Sherman
Act's legislative history. In the debate in the Senate it was argued
that the Bill, if enacted in its original form (for which Senator Hoar
was largely responsible), would be employed to oppress labor and
agricultural organizations. Senator Sherman offered a proviso ex-
empting the activities of such organizations from the Act. Senator
Edmunds attacked this proviso on the floor of the Senate and the
Bill was then referred to the Judiciary Committee, of which Senator
Edmunds was Chairman. The language of the Bill was materially
altered by the Committee and no proviso exempting labor was in-
cluded. Senator Edmunds, who had vehemently opposed the ex-
emption, professed himself satisfied, and no reference to the labor
problem appears in the subsequent debates in either the Senate or
the House.
It has been argued that the elimination of Senator Sherman's labor-
exemption proviso clearly indicates that Senator Edmunds' view pre-
vailed. If so, why then did not the protagonists of labor voice their
objection to it? On the other hand, it has been contended that the
revised Bill, by using language normally applicable only to business
combinations, made any specific exemption of labor unions unneces-
sary, but the latter argument begs the question, and leaves Senator
Edmunds' acquiescence unaccounted for. A solution which will ex-
plain the reconciliation of the conflicting senatorial positions is that
while the revised Bill was regarded as not exempting labor entirely,
it was accepted as applying only to unlawful labor activities. The
Bill, to which the proviso had been appended, originally gave justifi-
able grounds for believing that activities of labor unions which had
been previously regarded as lawful would be in violation of its terms.
The removal of this threat by the revision of the Bill sufficed to
satisfy the advocates of the proviso, without giving to labor a blanket
immunity which would have met with the continued opposition of
Senator Edmunds. This interpretation is substantially in accord with
the last Supreme Court opinion treating the matter.
14
The Supreme Court first applied the Sherman Act to labor unions
in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908), known as the Danbury
13. For statements of this view see Berman, Labor and the Shcrmmt Act,
(1930) pt. 1. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, 39 COL. L. REV.
1283 (1939), 40 CoL. L. Rtv. 14 (1940), advances a theory that the Sherman
Act was intended to apply to a very limited range of labor activities. MASON,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925) cc. VII, VIII, contends that the Act
was intended to apply to labor. For a general discussion, See MILLtR, ANTI-
TRUST LABOR PRoBLEms -LAW AND POLIcY, 7 LAW & CONTETMP. PROBLEMS,
82 (1940).
14. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
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Hatters case. This case was a treble damage action against a union
brought by a hat manufacturer employing about 230 people. Through
a nation-wide secondary boycott, pressure was brought by the union
against wholesalers and retailers to keep them from buying the plain-
tiff's hats in order to compel the plaintiff to consent to a closed shop.
The Supreme Court construed the Sherman Act to prohibit any
combination whatever which essentially obstructed the free flow of
commerce between the States, or restricted, in that regard, the liberty
of a trader to engage in business. At common law, according to the
Court, "every person has individually, and the public has collectively,
a right to require that the course of trade should be kept free from
unreasonable obstruction", and the Sherman Act has a broader, not
a narrower, application than the common law rule. Thus any distinc-
tion between labor and business combinations was repudiated by the
Supreme Court at its first opportunity. This holding was in accord
with prior lower federal court decisions. 15
Three years later, the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v'. United
States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), held that illegal combinations could be dis-
solved under the Sherman Act. This caused union leaders to become
apprehensive that unions might be dissolved under the Act regardless
of the extent of their activities. Concurrently - and of more immedi-
ate importance to labor -the labor injunction was assuming a more
prominent role in labor disputes as a strike-breaking device. Organ-
ized labor trained its guns on both the labor injunction and the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to union status and activities, and protec-
tion against these threats was promised in the Democratic platform in
the Presidential campaign of 1912. These promises to labor were
dealt with in the Clayton Act of 1914.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act16 prevents the granting of injunctions
by federal courts against certain specific labor activities which even at
that time were generally considered legal, such as peaceful picketing.
By implication it left undisturbed the illegality attached to certain
other conduct.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act,17 after declaring that "the labor of
a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce," provides
that "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations . . .or
15. United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (E.
D. La. 1893), affirmed, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893) ; In re Debs, 64 Fed. 724,
745, 755 (N. D. Ill. 1894), affirmed, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
16. 29 U. S. C. §52.
17. 15 U. S. C. §17.
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to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be il-
legal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws." This section was the answer to the other promise
made in 1912, following the apprehensions engendered by the Standard
Oil Company decision. It removed all doubt of. the right of labor
to organize in unions, and affirmed the legality of their status. How-
ever, by the use of such language as "legitimate objects," and by
legalizing not the acts of labor organizations or their members, but
only the organizations and members themselves, it is plainly con-
fined to an attempt to protect labor unions against a charge of an un-
lawful status.
With the Clayton Act, as with the Sherman Act, the legislative his-
tory does not show that Congress intended to exempt all union activi-
ties from the Act. In the course of the debates in the House, after
a question had been raised as to the meaning of Section 6, and par-
ticularly the meaning of the declaration that labor is not a commodity
or article of commerce, a clear-cut labor exemption proviso was offered
by way of amendment and rejected.'
8
After the passage of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court took the
first opportunity to refute, in very explicit language, the suggestion
that the Clayton Act had created any blanket immunity for labor
unions. In Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443 (1921), a majority of the court held that Section 6 of the Clay-
ton Act protected only the existence of labor organizations. The Act
was said to be merely declaratory of the prior substantive law -
merely declaratory of what the best practice always had been for the
granting of injunctions. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Council, 257 U. S. 184, 203 (1921). Further, §20 was construed
to apply only where an employer-employee relationship existed.
Since the Clayton Act allowed individuals as well as the government
to seek injunctions, the injunction problem became increasingly acute
in the eyes of labor organizations. The question of what a union
could or could not do legitimately to further its interests was fre-
quently litigated in the 20's, and the now famous labor dissents of
Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone were mostly concerned with
the question of the justifiable extent of a labor union's interest in in-
dustry-wide conditions in how far a union could go to further the
welfare of its members.
18. See footnote 13, supra.
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The cases decided under the Clayton Act recognized that a union
cannot be effective in raising the wages of its members without going
outside a single employer's shop. As Chief Justice Taft expressed
it, "It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in the
same community united, because in the competition between employ-
ers they are bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their
trade in the neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propa-
ganda to enlarge membership and especially among those who labor
at lower wages and willingly injure their whole guild." American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. at 209.
Some members of the Court went further. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
in his dissenting opinion in Hitchnan Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229, 268 (1917), stated that the desire of the United Mine
Workers to unionize every mine on the American continent, and es-
pecially those mines in competition with mines already unionized, was
not unlawful but was part of a reasonable effort to improve the con-
dition of working men engaged in the industry by strengthening their
bargaining power through unions and extending the field of union
power.
In spite of these favorable legal demonstrations, unions still found
the Sherman and Clayton Acts embarrassingly restrictive, and the
use of the injunction as a strike-breaking weapon increasingly oner-
ous, as unions expanded and sought greater power.
The result of labor's hue and cry was the Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932, which broadly and unequivocably removed the jurisdiction
of any federal court to issue any restraining order or injunction in
practically any case arising out of a labor dispute. Thus, labor finally
secured immunity from the injunctions that had plagued so many of
its organizing campaigns.
The main object of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to remedy what
was felt to be an existing evil, namely, a too-liberal use by the federal
courts of their equity power to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
Labor unions and their partisans had contended that whatever power
labor might possess through collective action was effectively canceled
by the ability of employers to secure temporary restraining orders
against strikes, picketing, and other concerted activities, merely by
filing an affidavit, in a federal district court, without notice to the
opposing party. To remedy this situation, the Act provided in sub-
stance that the federal courts should no longer have jurisdiction to
issue restraining orders or temporary or permanent injunctions in any
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.
It will be noted that to some extent the Norris-LaGuardia Act
7
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duplicates Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Two significant distinc-
tions between these statutes exist, however.
The first of these differences is that the term "labor dispute" is de-
fined explicitly in the Norris-LaGuardia Act to cover more ground
than was covered by Section 20 of the Clayton Act. *A labor dispute
may exist, within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, "whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee". (Section 13(c) ).
The second major difference between the Clayton Act and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is that the latter purported to do no more than
regulate the issuance of injunctions by the federal courts. Whereas
Section 20 of the Clayton Act contained the substantive provision
that none of the labor activities therein mentioned should "be con-
sidered or held to be violations of any law of the United States", the
Norris-LaGuardia Act nowhere contains such a provision.
With the law in this posture, the Department of Justice in 1939
began a nation-wide campaign against racketeers in the building trades,
where labor unions were prohibiting the use of new building tech-
niques, imposing wasteful feather-bedding practices on employers,
and, in general, restraining trade through callous abuse of their power.
No clearer example of restraints of trade can be conceived than the
policy of certain unions of excluding from a geographical area the
products of companies in competition with local employers of union
labor.
Criminal prosecutions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts were be-
gun on a nation-wide basis, and numerous indictments secured. The
whole campaign, however, came to naught when the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941), that labor
activities exempted from injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
were by implication exempted completely from the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act. This case involved an employer caught in the
middle of a jurisdictional dispute between the carpenters' union and
the machinists' union. The carpenters' union called a strike, picketed
the premises, requested its members throughout the nation not to
buy the employer's product, and attempted to foment sympathy strikes.
The holding in this case might well have been that the direct employer-
employee relationship brought this case within the immunities pro-
vided by Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Instead, the majority opinion
by Mr. justice Frankfurter was based on the theory that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act had in effect amended both the Clayton Act and the
Sherman Act to immunize all concerted labor activities where pursued
by labor unions acting in their own interests and where such activities
8
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were involved in or grew out of labor disputes as defined in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. This bombshell was fatal to the Department of Jus-
tice's attempts to remove these log-jams in the stream of interstate
commerce and explains why the Department cannot adequately deal
with problems like the present coal situation.
The licit and illicit under Section 20 of the Clayton Act were no
longer, after the Hutcheson case, to be distinguished by any judgment
regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the
selfishness or unselfishness, of the end which the particular union ac-
tivities sought to achieve. And the case of Hunt v. Crumboch, 325
U. S. 821 (1945), underscored the holding in the Hutcheson case
that motive and wisdom are immaterial. In that case the union's
grievance stemmed wholly from a personal dislike for the employer,
because of which the union withheld its labor from the employer in
order to destroy him. Although the employer offered to sign a closed
shop contract, the union refused to let its members work for him, and
forced his customers, with whom the union had closed-shop contracts,
to cease doing business with him. Such conduct was held to be law-
ful under the doctrine of the Hutcheson case, on the theory that la-
borers can sell or not sell their labor on such terms as they please. The
employer was destroyed but left without legal recourse.
Under the Hutcheson case the only apparent limitations upon the
immunity accorded a union are that it must act to further its self-
interest as a labor organization, and cannot combine with non-labor
groups. Thus, almost any conflict can qualify as a labor dispute. Al-
though associations of independent merchants are not within the im-
munity, Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S.
143 (1942), nor are doctors, American Medical Association v. United
States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943) even employer-union combinations 19
may escape condemnation due to the extraordinary statutory standard
of proof required to show that the act of a union official can be said
to be the act of his union.
Section 620 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that
"No officer or member of any association or organization,
and no association or organization participating or interested in
a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court
of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers,
members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participa-
19. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797 (1945), held that
the Hutcheson doctrine had no application to employer-union combinations.
20. 29 U. S. C. §106.
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tion in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification
of such acts after actual knowledge thereof."
The Taft-Hartley Act 2' provides that "In determining whether any
person is acting as 'agent' of another person so as to make such other
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall
not be controlling," but the Taft-Hartley rule does not specifically
apply to antitrust actions. The Senate Report (105, 80th Cong., p. 21)
cites United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v.
United States, 330 U. S. 395 (1947), as necessitating a change in the
rule established by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
This case was a criminal action under the Sherman Act involving
an employer-union combination, and the lower court determined that
an offense was charged under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the ground that the trial court had refused
to give the necessary instruction as to Section 6. In other words,
by applying Section 6 to the criminal action, the Supreme Court was
extending still further its holding in the Hutcheson case.
The Supreme Court held that "authorization" as used in Section 6
means something different from corporate criminal responsibility for
the acts of officers and agents in course or scope of their employment.
The requirements of "authorization" were said to restrict
"... the responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer
or employee associations, organizations or their members for
unlawful acts of the officers or members of those associations or
organizations, although such officers or members are acting with-
in the scope of their general authority as such officers or members,
to those associations, organizations or their officers or members
who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear
proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that
type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily
followed from a granted authority, by the association or non-par-
ticipating member sought to be charged or was subsequently rati-
fied by such association, organization or member after actual
knowledge of its occurrence." 330 U. S. at 406.
However, Mr. Justice Franlfurter, who wrote the Hutcheson opin-
ion, dissented strongly in this case, and legislation is certainly neces-
21. 20 U. S. C. §152(13).
This provision makes clear that the common lav rule and not the Norris-
LaGuardia test applies. See the Conference Report, H. R. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
36.
10
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sary if his fears are justified. Referring to the Court's decision, he
stated that
"The holding is that the view which the trial court should have
taken, which all trial courts will have to take hereafter, and which,
whatever the language used in the charge, must control a jury's
findings from the evidence, is the elucidation which the Court now
gives to §6. For practical purposes, this elucidation immunizes
unions and corporate offenders for acts which their agents per-
form because they are agents and, as such endowed with authori-
ty. For practical purposes, a union or a corporation could not
be convicted on any evidence likely to exist, if the trial court
has to charge what the Court now holds to be required by §6."
330 U. S. at 417."
A careful evaluation of the possible effect of the United Brother-
hood of Carpenters case might well accompany any legislative attempt
to overrule the Hutcheson case, in order that a legislative intent to
apply the Sherman Act to unions in certain instances will not be frus-
trated before the courts by this secondary obstacle.
2. LABOR ACTIVITIES AS RESTRAINTS Ov TRADnE
The Hutcheson and United Brotherhood of Carpenters cases mark
the practical realization of the immunity of labor from the antitrust
laws originally sought in Loewe v. Lawlor. Labor's immunity has
grown by stages as the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts have been
construed to withdraw specifically enumerated practices of labor
unions from the general interdict of the Sherman Act until at the pre-
sent time this immunity encompasses practically all labor activities.
This protecting shield developed over a fifty-year period; and while
the immunity was still incomplete, the Courts also were considering
the companion problem of what types of union restraints were illegal
under the Sherman Act itself.
The application of the antitrust laws to labor unions in the absence
of the special exemption has assumed new virility due to proposed
federal legislation and actions in state courts based upon state statutes
similar to the Sherman and Clayton Acts, since the effect of remov-
ing by legislation part of labor's immunity would be to reinvigorate
and rejuvenate the concept of unreasonable restraints of trade as de-
veloped prior to the Hutcheson case.
While the basic language of the Sherman Act is unchanged, the
Supreme Court's version of its meaning has been subjected to modifi-
cations. The rule as to which restraints are illegal adopted in Loewe
11
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v. Lawlor, which held illegal a secondary nation-wide boycott of a
small hat manufacturer, was thus stated by the Court:
"In our opinon, the combination described in the declaration is
a combination 'in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States,' in the sense in which those words are used in the
Act, and the action can be maintained accordingly.
"And that conclusion rests on many judgments of this court,
to the effect that the act prohibits any combination whatever to
secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of com-
merce between the States, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty
of a trader to engage in business.
"The combination charged falls within the class of restraints
of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involun-
tarily not to engage in the court of trade except on conditions
that the combination imposes; and there is no doubt that (to
quote from the well-known work of Chief Justice Erle on Trade
Unions) 'at common law every person has individually, and the
public also has collectively, a right to require that the course of
trade should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction'." 208
U. S. at 292.
This concept was subjected to modification by the Standard Oil
case, 221 U. S. 1 (1911). That case first established the "rule of
reason", which declared that only those contracts which "unreason-
ably" restrained trade were outlawed by the Sherman Act. The
opinion contains an elaborate analysis of the common law dealing
with monopolies. Later, the rule of reason was declared applicable to
labor restraints, in National Association of Window Glass Manufac-
turers v. United States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923).
Typical of the cases following the Loewe v. Lawlor concept of physi-
cal interference with interstate commerce is Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 299 (1917), an extremely controversial
opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney, which upheld an injunction against
an attempt by the United Mine Workers to organize non-union mines
in which workers had agreed to quit work if they joined a union. In
dealing with such an employer the unions naturally strove to keep
the extent of their success in organizing secret until they were able
to close the mine by strike. Also the members of the union kept
working while awaiting the strike call. The opinion stressed the idea
that the employer's action in imposing the condition of non-union
membership was reasonable due to the difficulties in operating with
a union shop in the past. The union recognized these unorganized
12
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mines as a serious threat, since the competition produced by the un-
organized field rendered it more difficult for the operators of union
mines to grant concessions demanded by the union. Thus, in order
to relieve the pressure on union members and their employers else-
where, a concerted organizing drive was undertaken in the unorgan-
ized West Virginia district.
On these facts the Court held that the employer was within its legal
rights in employing its men only on terms of continuing non-member-
ship in the union. It was held the employer had a property right in
the employment relationship with its employees which could not be
interfered with by a third person. The union had violated this proper-
ty right by secretly soliciting among the employees in preparation for
a strike, and therefore the union was not pursuing its object by law-
ful means.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent is predicated on the proposition that
the organizing campaign in West Virginia was part of a reasonable
effort to improve the conditions of working men engaged in the in-
dustry by strengthening their bargaining power through unions, and
extending the field of union power. According to his dissent, the
employees were not induced to violate their contracts with the em-
ployer, but were merely solicited to join the union. This distinction
the majority of the Court declined to recognize.
A different approach is reflected in United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922). Chief Jtisfice Taft, speaking
for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded a judgment against
a union entered as a result of a strike accompanied with considerable
violence in the Arkansas coal fields. Some Arkansas mines which had
been operating as union mines decided to operate as an open shop.
The strike, fighting, and flooding of the mines followed. An injunc-
tion was secured, and non-union miners were brought in from outside
the state. Some of the strike breakers were shot in an attack by the
union forces.
The Court held that obstruction to coal mining is not a direct ob-
struction to interstate commerce in coal, although it may be affecting
it by reducing the amount of coal to be carried in commerce. The
U. M. W. pressed the unionization of the mines not only as a direct
means of bettering the conditions of the workers there, but also as
a means of lessening interstate competition for union operators. But
this latter was held to be only an ancillary motive, with the actuating
force in a given case necessarily dependent upon the particular cir-
cumstances to which it is sought to make it applicable. According
to the Court, if unlawful means had been used by the union to union-
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ize miners whose product was important, actually or potentially, in
affecting prices in interstate commerce, the union would be guilty of
an actionable conspiracy under the Sherman Act, but here the evi-
dence was held not to show any primary plan to control competition.
Loewe v. Lawlor was distinguished on the ground that the direct sub-
ject of attack there was interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
said that the capacity of the mines affected was not shown to be large
enough to affect substantially the market price of coal, and the de-
cision of the lower court was reversed.
A new trial was granted, which resulted in a directed verdict for the
defendants, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court for a
second time. 268 U. S. 295 (1925). New evidence was introduced
at the second trial to show that a major purpose of the strike was to
prevent the non-union coal from competing with coal produced by
union mines. Evidence about union meetings, and testimony by
former union officials, indicated the great concern of the union over
that part of the industry not covered by union contracts. New evi-
dence also showed that the productivity of the mines in question was
much greater than had been indicated in the first opinion of the Court,
and could have an effect upon the general price level of coal. The
Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence at the second
trial to show that the purpose of the strike was to stop the production
of non-union coal and to prevent its shipment to markets in other
states where it would be in competition tending to reduce the price
of the commodity and affect injuriously the maintenance of wages
for union labor in competing mines.
United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265
U. S. 457 (1924) involved a strike to secure a closed shop. Illegal
picketing and violence followed and in consequence the employer was
unable to fill orders from out of state. There was no evidence as
to any attempt to impose a boycott or to prevent shipment in inter-
state commerce of already manufactured products. The Court held
against the employer on the ground that only where there is a direct
intention to restrict interstate commerce and thus to create inflated
price structures or prevent price competition is there a violation. "It
is only when the intent or the necessary effect upon such commerce in
the article is to enable those preventing the manufacturer to monopo-
lize its supply or control its price or discriminate between its would-
be purchasers, that the unlawful interference with its manufacture
can be said directly to burden interstate commerce."
Important distinctions between the second Coronado and Herkert
cases are hard to find since in both cases the unions acted with the ob-
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ject of either compelling unionization or forcing employers out of
business. Although there was proof in the second Coronado case, as
there was not in the Herkert case, of an intention on the part of the
union later to gain the elimination of non-union mined coal in the
national markets, such proof was not required in the secondary boy-
cott cases of Loewe v. Lawlor and Duplex Printing Press Company v.
Deering. The confusion was enhanced when the Court in 1927 de-
cided Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Associa-
tion, 274 U. S. 37, (1927) which, following the two cases last named,
held unlawful a nation-wide secondary boycott.
This confusion remained relatively static until the Supreme Court
decided Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940), a civil
action for treble damages under the Sherman Act against a union
which had thut an employer down by use of sit-down strike tactics.
The strike was marked by violence; and although the jury only found
an intent by the union to conduct a sit-down strike, there was specific
testimony that the strikers refused to permit the withdrawal of finished
merchandise from the manufacturer's factory for shipment to fill
out-of-state orders.
The union argued once again that union activities should be granted
an immunity under the Clayton and Sherman Acts. Once again this
was rejected. Stating that mere violent interference with interstate
commerce, such as a train robbery, is not necessarily a violation of
the Sherman Act, Mr. justice Stone conceived the question as
"... whether a conspiracy of strikers in a labor dispute to
stop the operation of the employer's factory in order to enforce
their demands against the employer is the kind of restraint of
trade or commerce at which the Act is aimed, even though a
natural and probable consequence of their acts and the only
effect on trade or commerce was to prevent substantial ship-
ments interstate by the employer." 310 U. S. at 487.
The Court held that the Sherman Act was not designed to police
interstate commerce but was enacted "for the prevention of restraints
to free competition in business and commercial transactions which
tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the
market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of
public injury," 310 U. S. 493. According to the opinion, the Sherman
Act did not apply in any case, whether or not involving labor organi-
zations or activities, unless there was some form of restraint upon
commercial competition in the marketing of goods and services, and
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could not apply in cases of local strikes conducted by illegal means
in a production industry except where it was shown that the restric-
tion on shipments had operated to restrain commercial competition
in some substantial way. In other words a restraint on competition
in the course of trade in articles moving in interstate commerce is
not enough unless the restraint is shown to have, or have been in-
tended to have, an effect upon prices in the market, or otherwise
to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they
might derive from free competition. Although, in order to render a
labor combination effective, it must eliminate the competition from
non-union made goods, and although the elimination of price compe-
tition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of many
national labor organizations, this effect on competition was stated not
to be considered the kind of curtailment of price competition pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act. It was observed that in each of the
cases where the Act was held applicable to labor unions, the activi-
ties affecting interstate commerce were directed at the control of the
market and were so wide-spread as to affect it substantially.
Mr. Justice Stone did not find it necessary to overrule any prece-
dents. Loewe v. Lawlor, and the Duplex Printing Press Company
and the Bedford Cut Stone Co. cases were all distinguished on the
stated ground that in those cases,
"the effort of the union was to compel unionization of an employ-
er's factory, not by a strike in his factory but by restraining,
by the boycott or refusal to work on the manufactured product,
purchases of his product in interstate commerce in competition
with the like product of union shops.
"In the Bedford Cut Stone Co. case it was pointed out that, as
in the Duplex Printing Press Co. case, the strike was directed
against the use of the manufactured product by consumers 'with
the immediate purpose and effect of restraining future sales and
shipments in interstate commerce' and 'with the plain design of
suppressing or narrowing the interstate market,' and that in this
respect the case differed from those in which a factory strike,
directed at the prevention of production with consequent cessa-
tion of interstate shipments, had been held not to be a violation
of the Sherman law.
"That the objectives of the restraint in the boycott cases was
the strengthening of the bargaining position of the union and
not the elimination of business competition - which was the end
16
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in the non-labor cases - was thought to be immaterial because
the Court viewed the restraint itself, in contrast to the interfer-
ence with shipments caused by a local factory strike, to be of a
kind regarded as offensive at common law because of its effect
in curtailing a free market and it was held to offend against the
Sherman Act because it affected and was aimed at suppression
of competition with union made goods in the interstate market."
310 U. S. at 506.
In The Apex case the Court found the elements of restraint of trade
present in the second Coronado case, and alone to distinguish it from
the first Coronado case and the Leather Workers case were here lack-
ing. The restraints imposed were said not to be within the Sherman
Act unless they were intended to have, or in effect have, the effects on
the market on which the Court had relied to establish the violations
in the second Coronado case, and restraints not within the Act when
achieved by lawful means are not brought within its sweep merely
because, without other differences, they are attended by violence.
Thus, after 13 years, an attempt at a definitive statement of the
application to labor unions of the antitrust acts was finally given. Un-
fortunately, it has had little practical value yet, because the next year,
in the Hutcheson case, labor unions were accorded the immunity from
the Sherman Act which they had been denied in the Apex case.
The Apex case shows that buried beneath the gloss of the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, the Sherman Act still condemns restraints
of trade in the same forceful and unequivocal language as in 1890.
Labor unions are immune only because of Supreme Court's construc-
tion of the subsequent statutes, and the Supreme Court has recently
held22 that there is no constitutional ground requiring the exemption
of any group from the anti-trust laws.
3. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Being mindful of the background of antitrust law just discussed,
is it possible to outlaw those restraints on commercial competition
that threaten the national economy, without endangering the very
existence of unions, or unduly restricting the pursuit by unions of
their legitimate objectives? The Senate Committee on Banking and
22. Giboney v. Empire Storagd Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949). See Carpenters and
joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942). However,
the widespread use of State statutes would encounter other difficulties.
Cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
315 U. S. 740 (1942).
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Currency held hearings2 3 from July 25 to August 26, 1949, on the
economic power of labor organizations, and numerous experts placed
before the Committee their suggestions as to the manner in which
the antitrust laws should be amended to prevent such situations as
the current coal crisis.
One proposed method was to outlaw union activity on a nationwide
basis.24 Another method proposed was to define specifically and to
spell out the particular kinds of labor-union activities which are legal,
and those which are illegal.2 5 Such a task seems an almost impossible
objective, since once a list is made of the specific activities which are
declared to be unlawful, the list must always be qualified by some sort
of an exemption of activities of these kinds when they are clearly
pursued with the primary purpose of furthering a legitimate union
objective. Once such a qualification is introduced, the whole matter
of intention and purpose, i. e., whether the primary purpose is in
furtherance of legitimate union objectives like bettering working con-
ditions, or whether the primary purpose is to control production or
prices, becomes controlling. Thus the final decision of whether the
conduct is lawful or unlawful comes back to a finding by a court,
based on concepts not specifically spelled out. Thus the specific
enumeration would probably introduce new obscurities into the law
without removing any of the already more than adequate supply.
One proposal warranting mention would have modified the Sher-
man Act by outlawing labor monopolies through an amendment to
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, dealing with monopoly as a criminal
offense.26 The difficulty in applying any anti-monopoly criminal pro-
vision to unions is that the monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act
cannot be said to have the same sort of application to labor unions as
they have to business combinations. Every labor union is seeking
to monopolize the supply of labor, either on a comparatively limited
scale or on a national scale. That kind of monopolization is the
avowed objective of labor unions, and it has been approved as a mat-
ter of public policy by Congress, not only in the Wagner Act, but
also in the Taft-Hartley Act.27 Such an enactment would repre-
23. The hearings are officially entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, United States Senate 81st Congress, First Session, on
Effect of Economic Power of Unions Upon Banking and Credit Policies, Small
Business Enterprises, Consumers' Prices, and National Economic Stabilization".
Mr. Edward Miller testified at the request of the Committee. P. 752.
24. Hearings, pp. 188, 239.
25. Hearings, p. 80. The Hartley Bill, as approved by the House, contained a
provision of this type. 93 CONG. Ri~c. 3656, 3671, (April 17, 1947).
26. Hearings, pp. 136, 256.
27. Supra, footnote 6.
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sent a reversal of Congressional policy toward labor unions extending
back at least to the Clayton Act.2 8
Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, who conducted the hear-
ings, concluded that corrective legislation that suffered from none of
these defects was possible, and introduced the following Bill :29
(a) Section I of the Act of July 2, 1890, entitled 'An Act to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
ionopolies', as amended (U.S.C., title 15, sec. 1), is amended
by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following:
Providing, further, That when a labor organization or the mem-
bers thereof have unreasonably restrained trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, in articles,
commodities, or services essential to the maintenance of the na-
tional economy, health, or safety, or any substantial segment
thereof, such conduct shall not be made unlawful, and the juris-
diction of any court of the United States to issue an injunction
against any such conduct shall not be restricted or removed, by
the Act of October 15, 1914, entitled 'An Act to supplement
existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies and for
other purposes' as amended, or the Act of March 23, 1932, en-
titled 'An Act to amend the judicial code and to define and limit
the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other pur-
poses'."
(b) [Amends §3 ir like language to apply to territories and
the District of Columbia.]
This Bill emphasizes the public character of the injury suffered
from unreasonable restraints of trade, by its limitation to essential
articles, commodities, and services. It does not threaten legitimate
union activity, since it would only apply in instances where the unions
have imposed an "unreasonable" restraint. Thus the doctrine that
the possession of monopoly power is illegal whether or not exercised
is inapplicable. 30
The Robertson Amendment reinvigorates the Apex case doctrine
so that the state laws and the Taft-Hartley Act would still provide
the only curbs on violence in local strikes. The determination of
what is an "unreasonable restraint" would be left to the court, just
as it is with business combinations, and the Apex doctrine, plus Con-
28. See American Steel Fotindries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209
(1921).
29. Supra, footnote 9.
30. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 811 (1946).
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gressional expressions of policy in legislation concerning the role of
unions in the economy, would be the guide. So construed, the Bill
would be primarily useful in that it would prevent unions, with or
without the tacit consent of the employers, from imposing restrictions
on commercial competition that result in conditions as uneconomic as
if the same restrictions had been imposed by the employers. The
scope of the Bill would be quite limited, but it would provide a curb
on the unions that would prevent a recurrence of such crises as the
present coal shortage.
Whatever action is taken on S.2912, the potentialities of such
legislation will assure its periodic resurgence into prominence on both
the federal and state levels.
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